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Highlights
• European energy policy has had mixed fortunes in recent years: complex but
ambitious compromises (greenhouse gas reduction targets), clear and
feasible compromises (renewables), unhurried but steady progress in some
areas (internal electricity market), no breakthrough in other important fields
(internal gas market) and a dangerously passive stance in crucial subjects
(research and development). 
• While liberalising energy markets and combating climate change will remain
top priorities, securing energy supplies and energy price issues might
temporarily lose some appeal due to the crisis-induced energy demand dip.
• The Commission should not spend valuable financial and human resources
on: investments in generation, attempting to control energy price levels,
changing the settlement currency for oil imports or securing foreign energy
resources. Functioning markets will get all of these right.
• However, in some key energy policy areas, markets alone will fail. Thus,
mitigating climate change, directing investments in network infrastructure
and creating a single energy market should be the three interlinked priorities
for your term of office.
This policy contribution is a supplement to ‘Bruegel memos to the new
Commission: Europe’s economic priorities 2010-2015’(ISBN: 978-9-078910-
14-5), published 27 August 2009 and available at http://www.bruegel.org/
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MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR
ENERGY
GEORG ZACHMANN,DECEMBER 2009
STATE OF AFFAIRS
Energy was one of the key economic policy issues
before the financial and economic crisis hit the
world economy. In particular, (1) securing the
fossil fuel supply in the near future, (2) reducing
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, and
(3) containing the level and volatility of energy
prices were high on the agenda of all European
energy policymakers. The means to achieve these
common goals were often controversial, with dif-
fering conflict lines between the actors involved
(27 member states, at least four EU departments,
companies, NGOs). As well as these three major
shared goals, one important issue, where not only
the approach but also the general aim is contro-
versial, has been high on the European energy
policy agenda for years: (4) liberalising and build-
ing the single market. The European focus on this
issue is partly due to the explicit EU powers in this
field that serve as a lever to shape a common EU
energy policy, even in fields initially not intended
to be dealt with by the Commission, eg super-Euro-
pean pipelines such as Nabucco.
In the following we would like to brief you on these
four energy policy issues, the challenges that
await you in your term of office and how you
should deal with them. Your predecessor as com-
missioner in charge of energy policy was, despite
having limited powers and overlapping areas of
responsibility with other services (eg DG Compe-
tition, DG Environment, DG RELEX) initially able to
significantly shape energy policy in the EU. This
success was based on a series of strategic docu-
ments that defined the Commission’s broad aims
and helped to maintain the focus on these goals
throughout the legislative period. This forward-
looking strategic spirit was, however, less present
in the second half of your predecessor’s term of
office. The Second Strategic European Energy
Review of late 2008 is seen by many observers as
an unoriginal and unimpressive political compro-
mise. In particular the supply-side approach, indi-
cated by the absence of mandatory objectives for
energy efficiency and the lack of acknowledge-
ment of the role of big energy-consuming sectors
(transport and industry), has been criticised for
again missing some of the most important energy
and climate-related challenges.
Security of supply
Securing energy supply is a key objective of
energy politics. During your predecessor’s term of
office, three factors reinforced this focus.
First, the repeated gas conflicts between gas-pro-
ducing Russia and the transit countries Ukraine
and Belarus raised the question of European vul-
nerability to attempts at political or economic
blackmail by its biggest gas supplier. Conse-
quently, individual member states and groups of
countries tried to secure the support of the EU for
their respective infrastructure projects. Germany
was able to obtain the status of priority infra-
structure for the German-Russian Baltic natural
gas pipeline, which avoids all transit countries.
Currently, the EU strongly supports the ‘Southern
Corridor’ – the Nabucco pipeline that is intended
to bring Central Asian gas through Turkey to
Europe (thus avoiding Russia). In addition the EU
is pushing for binding storage requirements and
obligatory emergency plans to mitigate the short-
run effects of supply disruptions.
Second, the mid-2008 record-high oil price has
given apparent support to the ‘peak oil theory’,
according to which we are close to a point in time
at which oil production will start to decline. Con-
sequently, under this scenario, both the supply of
natural gas and oil are considered to be at risk.Georg Zachmann MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR ENERGY
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Coupled with the narrative that the availability of
these finite resources is a key driver for future
economic prosperity, it has been argued that
securing foreign fuel resources is a political prior-
ity to which other targets should be secondary.
Due to its limited external affairs responsibilities,
the EU has so far been rather inactive in this
‘resource rush’, while some member states have
taken national foreign policy decisions that could
be interpreted as opportunistic (eg France’s and
Italy’s courting of Libyan leader Gaddafi).
And third, major electricity blackouts in various
European countries (Germany, Italy), as well as
declining investment in network and generation
assets, have raised a question mark over the abil-
ity of existing regulations and markets to create
the necessary infrastructure. Here neither the
member states nor the EU have so far been able to
come up with a solution that assures the optimal
level of investment. In particular, national policies
such as the disputed German nuclear phase-out,
the scale-back in Spanish renewables subsidies
or the UK government’s pending plan to build
nuclear plants have created uncertainty detri-
mental to long-run private investment. This prob-
lem has been exacerbated by the credit crunch,
which, together with the economic crisis, has
caused a dip in energy demand and in turn a
severe decrease in energy sector investments.
These concerns about short-run disruptions to the
natural-gas and electricity supply and about the
long-run availability of energy sources are likely
to remain. But the interests of EU member coun-
tries do not necessarily converge. The Commis-
sion has the difficult task of finding compromises
that bring together individual member states’
interests around secure and cheap supplies and
a common stance towards supply security.
Energy prices
Oil prices per barrel increased from below US$60
in early 2007 to more than US$140 in July 2008,
only to fall to less than US$40 at the end of 2008.
A comparable price pattern was observable for
other fuels (coal, natural gas). The record high has
been blamed either on decreasing prospective oil
production (the ‘peak-oil’ theory, as noted above),
increasing demand from emerging economies, liq-
uidity-driven speculation, or a combination of
these factors. In the short term, the price hike had
a negative impact on a number of economic sec-
tors (eg airlines), final consumers and inflation in
energy-importing countries. The subsequent price
decline, by contrast, has hit all investment proj-
ects in energy exploration and production. How-
ever, for good reasons, both governments and the
International Energy Agency (IEA) have largely
refrained from attempting to influence this much-
discussed price pattern.
In the short term, excessively low energy prices
seem to be more of an issue than too-high price,
because the consequent low levels of investment
in fossil fuel production and exploration will lead
to steeply rising prices. But low prices also endan-
ger the development of biofuels and electricity
production based on renewable energy sources
(RES) that are necessary to decarbonise the
transport and power sectors. The challenge is thus
to maintain investment at an appropriate level and
channel funds towards building the low-carbon,
high supply-security energy system we would like
to see in the future despite the credit crunch and
low energy prices in the short term.
Climate change
Severe climate events (eg Hurricane Katrina in
2005) have focused public attention on man-
made climate-change issues. In the political
sphere, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
has provided much valuable experience concern-
ing the technical, economic and legal challenges
that will (it is hoped) be taken into account in a
future global arrangement to mitigate and adapt
‘There have been blackouts and declining investment in network and generation assets, but
neither member states nor the EU have been able to assure the optimal level of investment.’MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR ENERGYGeorg Zachmann
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to climate change. From the European perspective,
the results of the European Emissions Trading
System (ETS), which began operations in 2005,
have been especially interesting. Significant wind-
fall profits to the power sector, high volatility of
carbon prices, full pass-through of the carbon
price to consumers as well as low investments in
carbon-saving R&D and RES in some member
countries came somewhat unexpectedly for many
observers.
Based on these outcomes, in April 2009 the EU
adopted more ambitious and straightforward RES
and climate-change legislation. The EU’s new RES
rules set clear, mandatory national targets for the
share of RES in final energy consumption and a
mandatory Union-wide target for the share of RES
in the transport sector. In addition, the new cli-
mate-change rules set the scene for the ETS as it
will apply in the period from 2013 to 2020. Com-
plex rules for burden-sharing between individual
member states in the non-ETS sectors and
favourable conditions for the power sector in the
new member states allowed a compromise to be
struck that contains the long-desired full auction-
ing of emissions allowances for power producers
from 2013. The serious disregard of the need for
R&D in both rule-sets is, however, a missed oppor-
tunity that was not remedied by the EU’s subse-
quent Strategic Energy Technology Plan
(SET-Plan), which is anything but ‘strategic’. As
the SET-Plan neither empowers institutions and
allocates new funding, nor contains clear priori-
ties, the Commission is merely pursuing previous
policies on renewable, fossil and nuclear tech-
nologies. This reluctance to pick winner technolo-
gies is understandable given the strong interest
groups involved in this subject. But it is precisely
for that reason that a determined vision with
respect to the future energy system might have
helped member states to follow a targeted and
thus more cost-effective joint strategy.
According to the IEA, in 2007 global energy-related
emissions amounted to 28.8 billion tons of CO2.
These emissions are, after a short-lived, crisis-
driven dip, expected to grow unless sustainable
measures are imposed. Meanwhile, the EU power
sector alone is still emitting around 1.5 billion tons
of CO2 each year. Consequently this subject, which
is in danger of losing political appeal, has to
remain a policy priority. Furthermore, a global
binding climate agreement will have to be pursued
in 2010 and the results of this activity – whatever
they will be – put into practice. Probably the
biggest challenge for international policy in the
next decade will be to ensure that the objective of
keeping the global temperature rise to no more
than 2°C above pre-industrial levels, as signalled
by the Copenhagen Accord, can be kept to, with the
burden shared fairly between all partners. 
Liberalisation
Antitrust cases against E.on and EdF provided evi-
dence that there are still significant concerns
about the market power held (and possibly exer-
cised) by Europe’s big energy companies. Fur-
thermore, mergers and acquisitions in the energy
sector have resulted in further consolidation of the
corporate landscape. In addition to the ‘old’
national champions, Gazprom has significantly
increased its presence on the scene over the last
few years by securing assets all over the EU. 
The inability to freely shift natural gas volumes to
the places where they were most needed during
the January 2009 gas crisis, as well as persistent
electricity-price differentials among member
countries, have shed light on the need for
improvements in the single European energy
market. Thus, despite a corpus of EU legislation,
notably in 1996, 2003 and 2009, Europe still does
not have a single energy market.
Owing to gaps in electricity interconnection, an
integrated market is unlikely to develop in the near
future. This problem is likely to worsen as, besides
bottlenecks between the different asynchronous
zones of the European high-voltage grid, conges-
tion will increase within these zones and even
within certain countries as a result of geographi-
cally uneven distribution of the development of
RES. The effect of existing holes in the natural-gas
network is made worse by the absence of trans-
parent regional price signals that could be used toGeorg Zachmann MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR ENERGY
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direct gas flows through a bottleneck-rich net-
work, including in cases of emergency. Finally, as
long as 13 years after the first major piece of EU
legislation, political pricing of energy still is an
issue hampering the development of a level play-
ing field not only in the energy sector but also for
energy-intensive industries.
The last Commission addressed some of these
challenges in its third liberalisation package. Steps
to foster international competition and to unbun-
dle generation and transmission assets were con-
sidered key tools. However, the unbundling
requirements were very controversial. Some
observers argue that the Commission was able to
shape a compromise close to what some member
states wanted but which in substance implements
the position of the Commission by making the
‘third-way’ option, introduced by some member
states, unattractive for integrated companies. The
creation of a European Network for Transmission
System Operators (ENTSO) and an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is
expected to favour the development of truly Euro-
pean energy infrastructure. But in their current
form both institutions lack the necessary imple-
menting and enforcement powers.
Conclusion
With respect to the aims outlined in the EU’s Green
Paper and the Energy Action Plan the results of
European energy policy in the last years have
been mixed: complex but ambitious compromises
(greenhouse gas reduction targets), clear and fea-
sible compromises (renewables), unhurried but
steady progress in some areas (internal electric-
ity market), no breakthrough in other important
fields (internal gas market) and a dangerously
passive stance in crucial subjects (R&D). In the
institutional setting of the EU this account could
be seen as fairly successful. In particular the pre-
vious Commission was able to ensure that, even
in troubled times, energy remained high on the
political agenda of the EU.
While liberalisation of energy markets and com-
bating climate change will remain top priorities,
securing energy supplies and energy-price issues
might temporarily lose some appeal due to the
crisis-induced dip in energy demand.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Markets are a powerful tool in helping to solve
many issues. Thus, the Commission should not
spend valuable financial and human resources on:
investments in generation, controlling the level
and volatility of energy prices, changing the set-
tlement currency for oil imports and securing for-
eign energy resources. Functioning markets can
get all of these right.
But there are energy policy areas where markets
alone will fail. Thus, mitigating climate change,
directing investments in network infrastructure
and creating a single energy market should be the
three interlinked priorities for your term of office. 
Security of supply
The importance of securing the supply of fossil
fuels from abroad was overstated by your prede-
cessor. Securing physical supplies to Europe must
not be a political priority of the Commission for
several reasons:
First, we would like to note that empirical and
modelling evidence concerning the interaction
between the supply of substitutable resources
and long-term prosperity is mixed. While the oil
price shocks of the 1970s led to a severe eco-
nomic crisis, the reduced share of oil in produc-
tion, improvements in monetary policy, more
flexible labour markets and some concurrent
adverse shocks implied that the effects of the oil
‘The creation of a European Network for Transmission System Operators and an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators should favour the development of truly European energy
infrastructure. But currently both institutions lack implementing and enforcement powers.’MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR ENERGYGeorg Zachmann
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price shocks of the 2000s were much milder.
Models suggest that, given technological
advances and the substitutability of oil as a pro-
duction factor, crude oil price increases do not nec-
essarily lead to dramatic negative long-term
output effects.
Second, the recent discoveries of huge oil and gas
fields off the coast of Africa and Brazil, as well as
the proven capacity of producers of non-conven-
tional oil to come in as soon as prices are high
enough, have demonstrated that overall oil pro-
duction can still be increased. Furthermore, even
though global natural-gas demand will increase at
1.5 percent per year between 2007 and 2030 in
the reference scenario of the IEA, sufficient
reserves for 60 years are proven (estimated
reserves are almost 300 years).
Third, in addition to the general doubts about the
advantages of playing the ‘great game’ in pipeline
politics, the pressure to diversify natural gas
supply to Europe has diminished significantly
recently. As the present increases in the produc-
tion of cheap shale gas allow the US to reduce its
imports significantly, much of the liquid natural
gas (LNG) production capacity intended for the
American market will be available for providing a
much cheaper diversification option to Europe
than laboriously hammering out pipeline projects
avoiding either Russia or Ukraine and Belarus. 
Fourth, oil demand in OECD countries is expected
to continue to decline even after the crisis. Accord-
ingly, many pieces of economic literature suggest
declining economic dependency on this fuel
source.
Consequently, neither the alarming narrative of
energy-hungry emerging countries fighting for the
last remaining sources of a fuel essential for our
economic development nor the story of malicious
Russians and unreliable Ukrainians that are able
to switch off European lights prove accurate. Thus,
inappropriate measures based on skewed analy-
sis should be avoided. In fact, we believe that the
prices we are willing to pay will assure us our fair
share of foreign resources.
While there is no need to mobilise political capital
to solve the above-mentioned strategic issues,
smoothing the functioning of global energy mar-
kets by means of targeted measures could never-
theless prove highly beneficial. Concerning oil
supplies it would, for example, be essential for the
international community to ensure that China
does not obtain a competitive advantage by ignor-
ing international standards. As for comparable
issues such as intellectual property rights or
labour standards the relevant measures from the
trade negotiation toolbox should be used to
enforce compliance. For natural gas supplies an
additional natural-gas pipeline that crosses nei-
ther Ukraine nor Belarus would certainly help to
discipline these countries that form a non-coordi-
nated duopoly for gas transits from Russia. Alter-
natively, stronger economic integration with these
countries that would provide a lever for enforcing
compliance of the transit contracts might do the
same job much cheaper.
By avoiding participation in the ‘great game’ the
Commission will have saved political capital for
the post-Copenhagen climate negotiations with
the US and China, which must succeed. Further-
more, steering clear of geopolitics might free
major resources for developing a coherent trans-
European network for electricity, natural gas, oil
and carbon. Such a meta-network would be the
basis for a functioning single energy and carbon
market and thus a key component of an efficient
solution to all the challenges outlined above. The
meta grid should be able to absorb the desired
amounts of RES, make switching fuels for cars and
power generation easier and thus stimulate intra-
fuel competition, use the advances in information
‘Neither the alarming narrative of energy-hungry emerging countries fighting for the last
remaining sources of a fuel essential for our economic development, nor the story of malicious
Russians and unreliable Ukrainians that are able to switch off European lights, are accurate.’Georg Zachmann MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR ENERGY
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and communications technology to satisfy the
energy needs of consumers at the lowest cost and
minimum emissions (Smart grid) and take the
carbon produced by burning fuels to the desig-
nated sequestration infrastructure. Through set-
ting unbundling requirements as well as by
establishing ACER and ENTSO the previous Com-
mission has already laid the foundations for inter-
nationally coordinated development of a truly
European energy network. What must follow is a
consistent and binding infrastructure develop-
ment plan.
Energy prices
Manipulating the energy price process by eating
into strategic stocks, varying energy taxes or
changing the settlement currency for oil will do
more harm than good. First, the adverse conse-
quences of intervention in terms of investment
incentives (if governments use strategic reserves,
the incentives for building commercial stocks
would suffer) outweigh the short-run smoothing
of prices. Second, the type of price developments
(structural or cyclical) and thus the economic
impact of intervention (delaying adjustment or
smoothing) remain unforeseeable. Third, the price
projections available to politicians are both noto-
riously unreliable and subject to political influ-
ence. Thus, the incomplete understanding of
markets makes any ex-ante evaluation of the
costs and benefits of any intervention a gamble.
One warning sign for politicians not to interfere in
the price process is the recent adjustment of price
predictions for 2030. While in 2008 the US Energy
Information Administration forecast an oil price of
US$70, the corresponding forecast in 2009 is 80
percent higher (US$130). 
Climate change
Many policymakers, including Commission Presi-
dent Barroso, see climate change as the single
most important long-term challenge for Europe
and globally. Consequently, (and as suggested by
Bruegel) President Barroso underscored this pri-
ority by appointing a dedicated climate-action
commissioner. But climate issues will also be high
on your own agenda as the energy sector remains
one of the largest sources of man-made green-
house gases. Thus, Europe will be faced with a
significant need to replace fossil fuels in the
energy sector. In this context, incentives for tech-
nological advancement and a requirement to use
best-available technology (BAT) in the energy
sector should receive more attention.
Technological developments will be the key to
solving the conflict of interest between cheap,
secure and environmentally friendly energy sup-
plies. Consequently, the Commission should strive
to coordinate the national R&D efforts with a clear
vision that goes beyond the SET-Plan. 
One tool that merits more attention in the climate
debate is the BAT requirement. By obliging the
users of energy-consuming and -transforming
technologies to install the best available equip-
ment, learning and scale effects will lead to a
reduction in cost in the mid-term. This will in turn
help non-EU countries to benefit from Europe’s
technological advantage.
Liberalisation
Creating a single market with transparent com-
petitive market-based price signals that will direct
energy flows and investments where they are
most needed is a pivotal challenge. In fact a func-
tioning single market for energy is the prerequi-
site for a consistent approach to all of the
aforementioned issues. In the absence of a level
European playing field, all emissions-reducing,
investment and R&D initiatives must be tailored
to specific national market situations. This would
cause an inconsistent, contradictory and thus
‘Creating a single market with transparent price signals that will direct energy flows and
investments where they are most needed is pivotal. You might have a last chance to depart from
unhealthy policymaking based on the unstable basis of 27 national energy markets.’MEMO TO THE NEW COMMISSIONER FOR ENERGYGeorg Zachmann
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highly inefficient and fragmented set of policies.
The resulting piecemeal approach will be difficult
to reverse as with every new initiative the com-
plexity of the inconsistent policies will be harder
to disentangle. Thus, maybe this new Commission
has a last chance to depart from the unhealthy
path of policymaking on the weak and unstable
basis of 27 disparate national energy markets.
Apart from the required physical meta-network
described above, clear rules are needed to ensure
transparent and fair access to infrastructure. Only
in this way will the desired benefits of functioning
markets be attainable. The new Commission
should therefore make sure that current legisla-
tion is properly implemented and does not betray
the compromises fought for by its predecessor. In
particular, you should whole-heartedly support the
European regulation and implementation of the
unbundling requirements into national law should
be carefully monitored. 
In brief, our three interlinked recommendations for
a coherent energy strategy are: (1) create a func-
tioning single European market for energy as a
basis for a coherent energy and climate policy; (2)
develop the network infrastructure necessary to
absorb the desired amounts of RES in the grids
and to allow for functioning trans-European com-
petition and (3) design a climate policybased on
the international agreements that is able to deliver
the desired emissions reduction targets at
minimum cost.